IDHAR UDHAR KI BAAT 145 — THE CHAI-PAKORA STRATEGY Brig PS Gothra (Retd.)

  

"Fauji, teri maan nu..." The Pakistani terrorist on the other end of the radio followed it with a few more abuses.

His gaalis gave me an excellent opportunity to unleash my considerable knowledge—and some innovation—of Punjabi gaalis. Having exhausted my vocabulary, I discovered another weapon. I kept the press-to-talk switch pressed even when I had nothing to say. His frequency remained jammed. I was delighted. Somewhere in the Kashmir mountains, I imagined a frustrated terrorist banging his radio set.

My victory lasted a few days. Then he came back on air with a more powerful transmitter and happily communicated through my jamming.

Twice every day, we could hear the terrorists giving their OK report to their control station. It was usually followed by a motivational tarana. Amateur that I was, I became convinced that if I listened long enough, one terrorist would surely say something like:

"Kal subah nau baje hum falane jungle ke teesre ped ke neeche milenge."

Fifteen days later, I realised that intelligence gathering was slightly more complicated. We needed better technology. Then I heard about direction finders. Wonderful, I thought. If the fellow transmits, the machine will tell us where he is.

Higher headquarters procured a few sets. Unfortunately, the mountains apparently had not read the equipment manual. The results were not accurate enough.

The terrorists remained where they were. The faujis continued climbing mountains looking for them.

Years passed. When I returned to J&K to command a Rashtriya Rifles unit, things appeared much more sophisticated. Now there were bundles of printouts containing intercepted terrorist communications. Along with them came impressive-looking assessments. I diligently read them. For about a month. Then I realised that some assessments had only a passing acquaintance with what was happening on the ground.

The men in the monitoring detachments, I must add, worked extremely hard. Many were exhausted. The problem was not their dedication. The problem was converting enormous quantities of information into something useful to the man climbing the mountain.

Another technique involved measuring the strength of terrorist radio signals from different locations. After calculations and triangulation, a rough location would emerge. On paper it looked impressive. On the ground, "rough location" in the Himalayas can include several ridgelines, thick forests and enough slopes to considerably improve the cardiovascular fitness of an infantry battalion.

So once again...the fauji went jungle bashing.

Then came Thuraya satellite phones. Suddenly technology began delivering what we had always wanted—the location of the man speaking. Signal intelligence and technical agencies got their act together. Terrorist leaders using satellite phones could sometimes be located with remarkable accuracy.

The results followed. A large number of terrorist leaders were eliminated.

Naturally, Pakistan learnt quickly. Location spoofing and other countermeasures followed.

Technology had moved one step forward. The adversary moved another.

And the infantryman returned to his traditional technological platform—two legs.

There was, however, another interesting development.

Once terrorist leaders started getting eliminated in impressive numbers, presentations began explaining how this was the result of a brilliant strategy of leadership elimination.

I sat through one such briefing. The slides were excellent. Arrows moved beautifully. Boxes connected to other boxes. The strategy sounded formidable.

I raised my hand.

"Sir, if elimination of terrorist leadership is the strategy, what exactly is the method by which we intend to achieve it?"

There was silence. Somebody gave an answer that went round and round like a chakli. Someone else added enough sugar to turn it into a jalebi. Another slide appeared. I remained unconvinced.

Fortunately, the most reliable military solution to an inconclusive discussion arrived. Chai-pakora break. The meeting was saved.

Years later, I learnt an important lesson. Data is not intelligence. Intelligence is not assessment. Assessment is not strategy. And strategy without a workable method remains only a good intention. A PowerPoint presentation cannot bridge these gaps.

Technology is invaluable. It can intercept, locate, calculate and predict. But the adversary is also thinking. Every successful technique eventually invites a countermeasure. Direction finding is countered by radio discipline. Location tracking invites spoofing. Jamming is answered by a stronger transmitter.

And somewhere between the satellite, computer, analyst and headquarters sits the man who finally has to climb the mountain and find out whether the assessment was right.

Last week I read that U.S. Central Command had reportedly asked its intelligence analysts for "creative and unconventional" ideas to pressure and punish Iran.

I smiled. Perhaps even the world's most technologically powerful military occasionally reaches the same conclusion that I reached sitting with a radio set in Kashmir many years ago.

When the enemy learns your method... you need a new method.

And when nobody can think of one immediately...there is always chai-pakora.

Happy Independence Day

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