IDHAR UDHAR KI BAAT 92- KADVI BAAT Brig PS Gothra (Retd)

 

"Sir, we’ve finally taken our revenge," said the youngster, eyes fixed on the Prime Minister’s televised address.

"Yes, we all saw it," I replied solemnly. "The attack on Pahalgam shook the nation." Many blamed the government. Some defended it. But in all the noise, nobody asked the right question: who’s really responsible? We did surgical strikes. We did Balakot. Now we’ve done Operation Sindhoor and crushed them again. But has Pakistan changed? No. After all that thrashing, they do a copy cat DGMO conference and tell everyone ‘Kuch hua hi nahin sab jhot bolte hain’ (nothing happened, they are lying).”

“So then what?” he asked.

“Prevention. Make it costlier for Pakistan and its terror volunteers to act again.”

“But prevention, sir? Right now I just want to hit back still harder.”

“That’s your young blood talking. You must also feel the pulse of the mothers who send their sons to war. The fear of unknown when a soldier gets a sudden recall from leave—it kills the family slowly. Fortunately, our leadership handled this operation with maturity. It takes immense skill to escalate and then halt a war at the right point. Generally, leaders do not know how to handle a crisis skillfully; they simply leap onto the roller coaster without knowing how to steer or stop."

“You were going to talk about preventing another Pahalgam—not praising the Modi government.

“I will. But first, we must honour the fallen. Those killed in Pahalgam, their sacrifice must be equated with the sacrifice of the martyrs.  People like Sayed Adil Hussain Shah, the horseman who died trying to snatch the rifle of terrorist, must be given more recognition, more awards, more visibility and publicity.”

“Why?”

“Back in the 1990s, when Kashmiri Pandits were driven out, many Kashmiri Muslims wanted to help but didn’t have the courage to stand up against the terrorists. Today, that fear is cracking. A small act of courage like the horseman matters. If three more people would have stood up, the situation would have been different. We have to motivate the Kashmiri population to stand up.  General Giap defeated far superior enemies by turning the war into a people’s war. We must do the same—celebrate these acts of valour.”

“But why did Pakistan strike now?”

“They feel we’re silently eliminating their terror assets. Mufti Abdul Baqi Noorzai—gone in March 2025. Abu Qatal—eliminated mid-March. Also since December 2024, attacks by their home grown terrorists against Pakistani forces have escalated—Kalat, Bannu Cantonment, South Waziristan. Heavy losses. They suspect Indian agencies to be abetting these.”

“And the train hijack?” he asked.

“A disaster. BLA claims 214 hostages dead; Pakistan says 26. Either way, the Army's image took a beating. So they tried to restore it with a flashy attack in Pahalgam. A classic case of  'Khisiyani billi khamba noche'—like a frustrated cat clawing a post. But we should have seen it coming. Our intel should’ve picked up chatter, like satellite imagery requests by their proxies.”

“How can intel know all that?”

“By penetrating their forces. Planning an op like this involves people, logistics. If Pakistan was getting satellite images of Pahalgam through a third party, that’s a red flag. Either intel missed it, or reported it and it was ignored.”

“Infiltration should’ve been stopped at the LoC.”

“Ideally, yes. But weather and terrain make it hard. The deeper issue is cultural. Sometimes, the first tier knows infiltration happened but doesn’t report it up the chain—truth isn’t welcome. So the rear doesn’t act, and the enemy slips through. The DGMO has praised the good work by the BSF. But, in my time twelve years ago, BSF was only deploying  40% of its strength on the line of control. Rest were doing admin work in their headquarters.  Infantry had to fill gaps, which naturally is at the cost of something else. A common saying is: do inch kapda aage rakho toh peeche nanga, peeche rakho toh aage nanga—you cannot cover both ends with limited resources..”

“So, we will require more manpower?”

“Yes. And smarter deployment. After elections, J&K Police resources might have been diverted to VIP security. Pahalgam was left exposed. Plus, exam season ends, and suddenly every official’s family wants a free holiday in Kashmir. Security resources get stretched thin. The other day I saw the convoy of a Chief Minister of another state. It had more than thirty govt vehicles. Besides the load on manpower it is inconvenient to the local public on the roads.”

“So a serious audit of the manpower utilisation pan India is required?”

I saw him on the verge of yawning, but I continued.

“Pakistan has weaponized poverty, exploiting vulnerable youth since the 1980s with promises of paradise and money. We kill the terrorists—but never touch the pipeline. Their families are celebrated. If we target the handlers, recruiters—and yes, even the families—burn their houses, and inflict pain, that chain will snap. In addition, a wide publicity should be given to the terrorist burnt during the encounters. This sometimes happens when the fire breaks out during the cross fire in the house they are hiding. It will make the young boys see through the false promises of Jannat by the recruiters. That will make volunteers to think twice. And when supply drops, demand rises. This will require more money to be pumped in. Pakistani establishment would not like to reduce their share of cut from the money for perpetrating terrorism. Similarly, the fear of retribution will stop public to glorify this false martyrdom.”

“What else, sir?” he said, shifting impatiently. Maybe he has failed to understand what I want to say. But I cannot be more explicit than this.

“Conflict isn’t over just because missiles stop. We must come heavily on farzi after-action reports and citations. We must concentrate more to plug equipment gaps, and push for indigenous, cost-effective technology. It is time to call a spade, a spade like the Air Force Chief did regarding HAL.  The DRDO and the Ordnance Factory board should not get away due to our शिष्टचार & शालीनता (courtesy and civility). Remember we may have to fight China someday.”

“Sir... can I go for a pee break?”

As he walked away I thought Kadvi Baat is difficult to listen to and still difficult to act on. People prefer to do cabin cupboard and stash the Kadvi Baat in a kitbag.  Jai Hind.